

INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS

RE

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

INDEX

1. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Dec. 5, 1941.
2. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Oct. 10, 1941.
3. Newspaper article re Pearl Harbor.
4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before Grunert Board.
5. Copies of Messages.
6. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941.
7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1941.
8. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
9. Message to Hawaii.
10. Message from Melbourne, Australia to War Dept. & CG Hawaii.
11. Memo for Col. Hallbrook from Lt. Perry, Evaluation Section, Dec. 6, 1941, re Japanese Embassy burning code book.
12. Messages re weather broadcast.
13. Estimate of the Situation Dec. 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.
14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941.
15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Getow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations terminated with Japan.
16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles, Nov. 27, 1941.
17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16.).
18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops evacuating.
19. Message to G-2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12, 1941, re custodial detention list.
20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft.
21. Information received from the Orient, Oct. 28, 1941.
22. Copies of Messages.
23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor.
24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and Intentions.

EXHIBIT No. 1

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting)

Executive Officer:

Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick

Administrative Branch: Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

Intelligence Branch: Col. C. H. Mason

Balkans and Near East Section: Lt. Col. W. W. Cox

British Empire Section: Lt. Col. Homer Case

Central European Section: Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire

Eastern European Section: Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther

Far Eastern Section: Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton

Latin American Section: Lt. Col. R. T. Heard

Western European Section: Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham

Aviation Section

Editorial Section

Collection Section

Liaison Branch: Lt. Col. A. R. Harris
 Counterintelligence Branch: Lt. Col. J. A. Lester
 Safeguarding Military Information: Maj. W. P. Corderman
 Domestic Intelligence: Maj. W. A. Holbrook
 Plant and Utilities Section: Maj. W. E. Crist
 General
 Plans and Training Branch: Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper
 Plans and Training: Maj. H. V. Canan
 Geographic: Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill
 Approved March 10, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 2—See facing folder

EXHIBIT No. 3

[From The Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 28, 1944]

THE TRUTH OF PEARL HARBOR

(AN EDITORIAL)

By Basil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times

Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America.

Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to restrain Japan from war—chief weapon with which to win, if war came.

Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy. Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for them by the criminal negligence of others.

Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy—Bataan and Corregidor.

Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan.

It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the Japanese war.

Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of devotion," were not to blame for the disaster.

Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor?

Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty.

Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted and punished?

WHY?

The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor:

"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They, not we, will choose the time, the method and the place of their attack."

Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor?

Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations map marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes, made especially for this attack?

Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the kill?

Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7?

And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders?

INVESTIGATIONS

Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted—all secret. Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission, released a few weeks after Pearl Harbor.

Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony of none has been made public.

Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts investigation, none has been made public.